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ECB maintains interest rate at 4.50% but for how long? History of prior EU Rate pauses: 4 months | Oct 00 - Apr 01 12 months | Jun 07 - Jun 08 3 months | Jul - Oct 2011 4 months | Sept 2023 - Present ⏳SO FAR⏳ At least they could say that this is not the shortest one ever now that we are into month 4. Historical Average: 6 months (March 2024) Interestingly this is when the Bank Term Funding Program in the US is ending which was providing liquidity to the banks. It might be a case of one foset gets turned off and another gets turned on. PUKA
ECONOMICS:EUINTR
by PukaCharts
The risk manager – putting the US Treasury’s QRA on the radar While the US500 and NAS100 juggernaut rolls on and the VIX index remains under 13%, we ask what could derail this risk rally. One event which has shown form through 2023 as a market mover is the US Treasury’s QRA (Quarterly Refunding Announcement). For background the ‘QRA’ – or Quarterly Refinancing Announcement – is where the US Treasury Department announce and quantify its financing needs for the quarter ahead, as well as the composition and breakdown of T-bill and bond issuance. In effect, the QRA could be a complete non-event for markets, or conversely result in a repeat of the powerful moves that we saw in both episodes in August and November - where the US Treasury’s (UST) QRA marked major turning points and trending conditions across bond, equity, and FX markets. In the art of risk management, the QRA is an event worth monitoring. Dates for the risk diary On 29 January the UST announce its financing estimates for the period ahead. 2 days later (31 Jan) we get the breakdown of issuance and USD amount per maturity that they plan to target – this is key. Coincidentally, just to spice things up, the breakdown of the USTs bond issuance falls on the same day as the FOMC meeting. The August 2023 QRA case study In August 2023 the US Treasury detailed they would finance its ballooning fiscal deficit by issuing a greater amount of longer-term US Treasuries than what was expected. With the Fed no longer a buyer of US Treasuries and Japan and China reducing its UST holdings, the highly price-sensitive private sector was asked to take down the increased bond supply. The result was a sharp sell-off in the US 10yr Treasury, with yields rising from 4% to 5%. As US bond yields soared the S&P500 fell from 4600 to 4100, while the USD index (DXY) rallied by over 5%. The November 2023 QRA case study Turn to the following QRA in November 2023 and the US Treasury was keen to curb the sell-off in Treasuries, and a rising interest expense bill - subsequently announcing they would finance its fiscal shortfall away from longer-term bonds and towards US T-bills (debt instruments with maturities of less than 12 months). While we can also attribute some of the move in markets to the Fed ‘pivot’ and rising expectations of a rate-cutting cycle, amid a soft landing – the move towards ultra short-term T-bill issuance saw the US 10yr yield trend to 3.78%, largely driven by term premium falling from +40bp to -45bp. Subsequently, the DXY fell 6% and the S&P500 rallied 16%. Watch RRP balances The RRP facility is an important monetary policy tool for the Fed, as it sets a floor on short-term interest rates (repo, money markets). With money market funds holding a preference to buy US T-bills at govt auctions, over investing in the RRP facility, we’ve seen a consistent drawdown in the level of the RRP facility to $639.56b (search this on TradingView under code – RRPONTSYD). There are growing concerns that should RRP balances fall below $200b it may start to cause real stress in market funding rates, which as we saw in 2019 would have significantly negative implications for broad market sentiment. Many consider SOFR (Secured Overnight Finance rate) to be the most important market rate of all, as it represents the cost of short-term financing. If SOFR rates move higher than the level the Fed pays banks to park their excess reserves on their balance sheet (currently 5.4%) – a tool used to put a ceiling on short-term rates - it would show the Fed’s monetary policy levers are no longer functioning efficiently, and that the funding channels are broken. Traders can monitor this on TradingView by using the code FRED:SOFR-FRED:IORB – should this push above 0bp and certainly above 10bp it will get great attention. Break it down So, the concern is if the UST keep its current funding needs to be skewed towards T-bills, then RRP balances will likely fall to worrying levels, funding costs could blow out and equities will take a bath with the USD rallying on safe-haven flows. Conversely, if the US Treasury move to skew its borrowing needs towards long-term Treasury issuance, then term premium would rise and US 10yr Treasury yields would move higher, again taking the USD higher and equity lower – a re-run of the bearish moves we saw between August and October. This is a very simplistic breakdown of what is a highly technical concept, but the mix of debt funding could cause some short-term gyrations and it potential result in an earlier end to QT. Given the US deficit is a growing market and political issue, how it’s funded matters for markets - One for the radar.
FRED:SOFR
by Pepperstone
EURO Area Consumer Confidence - Confidence SLUMPSEURO Area Consumer Confidence - ECONOMICS:EUCCI The lower the minus figure on this chart the better the confidence is in the EU area (closer to zero the better). Rep: -16.10 🚨 Worse than Expected🚨 Exp: -14.30 Pre: -15.00 The Chart ▫️ We have a long term general downtrend in EU Consumer Confidence since 1985. ▫️ Prior to recessions we formed lower highs (red arrows on the chart) ▫️ We have not made a new all time high since Jan 2000 ▫️ Confidence has currently stalled and turned slightly lower coming in lower than expectations of -14.3 and instead coming in at -16.10. What's driving the data and how to read it? The Consumer Economic Sentiment Indicator (Consumer ESI) gauges the optimism levels among consumers in the EU. Conducted through phone surveys, the indicator encompasses 23,000 households, with variable sample sizes across the region. The survey includes questions on the current economic and financial conditions, savings intentions, and expectations related to consumer price indexes, the general economic situation, and major purchases of durable goods. The Consumer ESI is measured on a scale from -100 to 100, where -100 represents an extreme lack of confidence, 0 signifies neutrality, and 100 indicates an extreme level of confidence. Final Word The ESI indicator provides valuable insights into consumer sentiment, reflecting perceptions and expectations that can influence economic behavior and decision-making in the EU. Consumer sentiment is low in Europe with sentiment remaining below March 2022 levels with little sign of recovery as it stands coming in lower than expectations. Obviously with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, EU migrant crisis and Germany having full year of GDP decline for 2023 (Europe's largest economy), one can understand why the sentiment is so low. WE can watch for a turning point and a new high lower than -15 for a change in the right direction. PUKA
ECONOMICS:EUCCI
by PukaCharts
Macro Monday 30~U.S. Net Treasury International Capital FlowsMacro Monday 30 U.S. Net Treasury International Capital Flows In essence the U.S. Net Treasury International Capital Flows (US TIC Flows) refer to the movement of funds into or out of the United States through the purchase or sale of U.S. Treasury securities by foreign investors and governments. These flows of capital are an essential component of the overall balance of payments, reflecting the financial transactions between the United States and the rest of the world. What does the data represent exactly? The U.S. Treasury International Capital (TIC) system is compiled by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and provides information on cross-border financial transactions. The TIC data include details on purchases and sales of various U.S. financial assets and liabilities, such as Treasury securities, corporate bonds, equities, and banking flows. In simple terms the Foreign Purchases of U.S. Securities (inflows) are taken away from the U.S. Purchases of Foreign Securities (outflows) to present a overall net figure. The net result of these two components determines whether there is a net inflow or outflow of capital. What are the drivers of positive & negative flows? Positive Flows (>0 on chart) POSITIVE FLOWS in U.S Net Treasury International Capital result from factors such as attractive U.S. interest rates, a stable domestic economy, and global uncertainty that drives foreign investors to seek the safety of U.S. Treasury securities. During these periods, there is a net inflow of capital into the United States pressing the number higher above zero. Negative Flows (<0 on chart) Conversely, NEGATIVE FLOWS occur when other countries offer higher returns, there are concerns about the U.S. economic outlook, or global risk aversion prompts investors to repatriate funds. Exchange rate movements also play a role, as a stronger U.S. dollar can make U.S. assets less appealing. The interplay of the above mentioned factors influences the direction of international capital flows, which impacts the balance of purchases and sales of U.S. Treasury securities by foreign and domestic investor. Now that we have a general sense of what’s driving the data, and what makes an overall net positive and or net negative flow, let’s have a look at the chart. The Chart ✅ Since Jan 2019 there has been an upward trend in Treasury Inflows into the U.S (Black Arrow). ❌This upward trend had one sudden interruption causing a decline from Mar - May 2023 going from positive inflows of $114B to negative outflows of $159.4B, the timing of which coincided with the 2023 U.S Banking Crisis where three small-to-mid size U.S. banks failed. ✅ Since the Banking Crisis in May 2023 Treasury Capital flows have moved from overall negative outflows of $159.4B to overall positive inflows of $260.2B. A major turn around and reversion to the long term trend. ✅The recent surge in positive inflows to $260.2B are the highest recorded since August 2022 ($275B) In summary inflows to U.S Treasuries have been in an general uptrend since January 2019 with one brief interruption from Mar – May 2023 and inflows have increased significantly in recent months and look like they may be about to take out the Aug 2022 highs. Recession Patterns 1. More isolated recessions that were not globally systemic events led to positive net inflows into the U.S. Treasury however larger global events led to outflows from U.S. Treasuries, particularly if those global events involved the U.S. engaging in foreign conflicts. ▫️ During the DotCom Crash (No. 3 on the chart) – The tech sector was badly hit but it was not necessarily a global recession with the associated geopolitical turmoil. Foreign investors sought safety in the U.S. Treasury Market during this time. ▫️ Similarly during the brief Gulf War Recession (No. 4 on the chart) you can see that initially, there was increased net inflows however in Jan 1991 inflows sharply turned to outflows which coincided with the U.S. led invasion of Kuwait (a response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait). This was considered a global event and thus led to an exodus of outflows and repatriation of funds from the U.S Treasury Market. ▫️ More recently during the Great Financial Crisis (no. 2 on the chart) and the COVID-19 Crash (No. 1 on the chart) there was a significant outflow from U.S. Treasuries due to the magnitude of these global events. You can imagine foreign market participants clawing funds back into their respective countries to batten the hatches and get into a defensive financial position with global systemic risks high. Better to have a bird in the hand than two in the bush when the bush is on fire. ▫️One other pattern worth mentioning is highlighted in yellow on the chart with an A, B and C. Prior to the Great Financial Crisis and COVID-19 crashes we first had a reduction in overall U.S. Net Treasuries of $373B (A on chart) and $393B (B on chart), respectively. Within 13 to 16 months of both treasure drawdowns we had a recession. We recently had a drop of $437B (C on chart) which ended in May 2023. If history repeats and we had a recession within 13-16 months of this happening, this would be sometime between June and Sept 2024. An alternative view would be that the increase in declines from $373B (A) to $393B (B) to $437B (C) may correspond with the shortening timeframes from 16 months(A) to 13 months(B) to potentially 10 months(C) for the current $437B drop (C on the chart). This would suggest March/April 2024 as a potential recession timeframe (based on the historic reductive time pattern). The U.S. Net Treasury International Capital Flows is a fascinating chart to keep an eye on and should be added to the economic data armory as it will help us interpret what is really going on in the treasury market (there is a lot of false narratives out there ATM). It is also useful in informing us on what the global perspective is in terms of systemic risk vs isolated risk, and also from a historic recessionary standpoint offers value. The best investors in the world call the bond market the market of truth but I have found it hard to find a chart that illustrates this through a global lens UNTIL today. This chart captures that beautifully. Thanks for coming along again PUKA
ECONOMICS:USCFLong
by PukaCharts
$RUGRES 'August/2023 Accumulation'ECONOMICS:RUGRES The latest data from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS) report shows that Russia’s central bank increased its gold reserves in August, restoring reserves back to previous levels from earlier this year.⁠ ⁠ “IMF IFS data shows gold reserves at the Central Bank of Russia rose by 3 tonnes in August,” according to Krishan Gopaul, Senior Analyst at the World Gold Council. ⁠ ⁠ Analysts reacted positively to the data, but some raised questions regarding Russia's gold production and where the precious metal is going.⁠
ECONOMICS:RUGRES
by Mr_J__fx
U.S. Building Permits U.S Building Permits Rep: 1.495m ✅Higher Than Expected ✅ Exp: 1.480m Prev: 1.467m This chart is very similar to the Housing Starts chart I just shared in that it is in a long term uptrend since March 2009 (slightly before above charts April 2009). However there are a few differences. The drop in permits now versus 1998-2000 period is much much sharper. Like the U.S Housing Starts chart, lets watch the diagonal support and see IF we get a change of trend. What are U.S. Building Permits U.S. building permits are official approvals granted by local government authorities that authorize the construction, alteration, or demolition of structures within a specified jurisdiction. Worth noting that I shared the below chart earlier this week that seems to illustrate a sharp drop in New Home Sales which coincides with the sharp drop in permits above. Interestingly Existing homes sales appear to be increasing with this drop new home sales. Potentially with more existing homes (old supply) coming onto the market this may present a headwind for new permits and new homes going forward. With existing supply coming onto the market, you would think that this might help lower house prices, however demand and lower interest rates could offset this. Fascinating to watch this all play out Happy Thursday PUKA
ECONOMICS:USBP
by PukaCharts
U.S. Housing Starts U.S. Housing Starts Rep: 1,460m ✅Higher Than Expected ✅ Exp: 1.426m Prev: 1.525m (revised down from 1.560m) The chart illustrates that we are on a long term uptrend since April 2009 and this looks like a pull back similar to the pull back from 1998 - 2000 but on a large scale. If we lose the diagonal support I think this would show a real shift in the structure and trend. What’s included in U.S. Housing Starts? U.S. Housing Starts refer to the number of new residential construction projects on which construction has begun during a specific period, usually reported on a monthly basis. The data includes Single-Family homes, Multifamily homes (apartments), Building Permits (houses approved with construction not necessarily started by likely imminent) and house build completions. HAVE A FUPPIN GREAT DAY PUKA
ECONOMICS:USHST
by PukaCharts
PMI the last drop into march 2024The chart posted is the PMI and the green up arrows are when the PMI turned up . What also happened was the stock market began rather strong up moves at or within 60 days of the Up turn. The pmi is telling me we have been in a RECESSION and the treasury to mask the recession as been funding the Quarterly with T Bill .I look for the drop in the markets rather soon . And I also look to Yellen to do this with the fed at the same time dropping rates 25 basis by late march of may cycle . This is only being done to make sure they try everything they can do to stop yes I will say it TRUMP. 2025 the beginning of the phase seen 1937 to 1942 I am basis is the chart patterns and data from 1902 and money velocity data since 1913
ECONOMICS:USBCOI
by wavetimer
Understanding Initial Jobless Claims as a Market IndicatorIntroduction In the complex and multifaceted world of economic indicators, initial jobless claims hold a special place. As a measure of the number of individuals filing for unemployment benefits for the first time, this statistic offers a real-time glimpse into the health of the labor market, which in turn is a vital component of the overall economic landscape. This article delves into how initial jobless claims function as an indicator and their impact on the financial markets. Understanding Initial Jobless Claims Initial jobless claims refer to claims filed by individuals seeking to receive unemployment benefits after losing their job. These are reported weekly by the U.S. Department of Labor, providing a timely snapshot of labor market conditions. A lower number of claims typically signifies a strong job market, suggesting that fewer people are losing their jobs. Conversely, an increase in claims can indicate a weakening labor market, often a precursor to broader economic downturns. Initial Jobless Claims as an Economic Indicator Health of the Labor Market: The primary significance of initial jobless claims is its reflection of the labor market's health. A steady, low number of claims often correlates with job growth and declining unemployment rates, indicating a robust economy. Leading Indicator for the Economy: As a leading economic indicator, jobless claims can provide early signals about the direction of the economy. Spikes in claims can forewarn of economic contraction, while consistent decreases might indicate economic expansion. Consumer Spending: Since employment directly affects consumer income, initial jobless claims can also indirectly signal changes in consumer spending, a major driver of economic growth. Impact on Financial Markets Market Sentiment: Traders and investors closely watch initial jobless claims to gauge market sentiment. Fluctuations in these numbers can lead to immediate reactions in the stock, bond, and forex markets. Monetary Policy Implications: Central banks, like the Federal Reserve, consider labor market conditions when setting monetary policy. Rising jobless claims can lead to a more dovish policy stance (like lowering interest rates), while decreasing claims might justify tightening policies. Sector-Specific Implications: Certain sectors are more sensitive to changes in jobless claims. For instance, a rise in claims can negatively impact consumer discretionary stocks but might be favorable for defensive sectors like utilities or healthcare. Analyzing the Data Understanding initial jobless claims requires context. Seasonal factors, temporary layoffs, and unique economic events (like a pandemic) can skew data. Analysts often look at the four-week moving average to smooth out weekly volatilities for a clearer trend. Conclusion In conclusion, initial jobless claims serve as a crucial barometer for the economy and financial markets. Investors, policy makers, and economists alike monitor these figures for insights into labor market trends and the broader economic picture. As with any indicator, it's essential to consider jobless claims in conjunction with other data to fully understand the economic landscape.
ECONOMICS:USIJCEducation
by AlgoAlpha
MM29(b) - Existing Home Sales Versus New Home Sales U.S. Existing Home Sales & New Home Sales Comparing the Charts When you look at both charts and compare them you can see that between June 2022 and Sept 2023 the decreasing EXISTING home sales negatively correlated with the increase in NEW home sales. This would make surface level sense given the lack of existing homes being available creating a need for new housing. In recent months there has been a sharp divergence in the opposite direction, particularly in NEW home sales, which plunged from 717k in Sept 2023 to 590k in Nov 2023. EXISTING Home Sales increased marginally from 3.79m in Oct 2023 to 3.82m in Nov 2023. Is this a turning point? Obviously a combination of factors are at work here and its not just existing supply coming to the market that might be disrupting new home sales or vice versa but its interesting seeing this correlation and its something to keep an eye on for investors and policy makers. Sale of brand new homes creates a lot of economic activity and if sales are declining significantly whilst existing homes are starting to come back onto the market, one would presume it would stress the housing market and the economy. We may need reduced interest rates sooner rather than later to help fan the flames of the new housing market, or maybe its time the market takes a breather? What do you think? It certainly adds to the argument for lower rates sooner from the Federal Reserve to "soften the landing" or that divergence noted today. Each Chart is covered separately in todays Macro Monday PUKA
FRED:EXHOSLUSM495S
by PukaCharts
Macro Monday 29 - U.S. Existing Home Sales & New Home Sales U.S. Existing Home Sales & New Home Sales U.S. Existing Home Sales U.S. Existing Home Sales data helps us to gauge the strength of the U.S. housing market and is a key indicator of overall economic health in the U.S. In simple terms U.S. Existing Home Sales is a seasonally adjusted record of previously owned homes that have been sold in the United States (per unit). The monthly data report is released by the National Association of Realtors (NAR) and It is a lagging indicator since people often make housing choices in response to a changes in interest rates (which would lead ahead of this dataset). Decembers report will be released this Friday 19th Jan. I will update the chart then so we can see how the trend is developing. The Chart You can clearly see that we have been in a downtrend since October 2020 where we topped out at 6.73m units. Thereafter from Jan 2022 – October 2023 we fell precipitously from 6.34m down to 3.79m. Sales of previously owned homes in the U.S. went up 0.8% month-over-month to a seasonally adjusted annualized rate of 3.82m units in November 2023 (a turning point?), rising for the first time in five months, and rebounding from 3.79m in October which was the lowest level since August 2010. Whilst we are waiting for December 2023 figures, the Jan – Mar 2024 figures will also provide a good sentiment gauge for the direction in 2024. The chart has that look at present that it is basing here or potentially changing trend. Accessibility to existing homes is clearly low at present and one would think that low existing home sales clogs up the market and liquidity that might flow with it and the economy however, the low existing house sales also appears to create demand for New Homes which we will cover next. U.S. New Home Sales New Home Sales, also known as "new residential sales," is an economic indicator that measures sales of newly built homes (seasonally adjusted for annualized figures). The New Home Sales measure compiles data through interviews with home-builders and analysis of the U.S. Census Bureau's Survey of Construction. Specifically, it utilizes information on building permits issued for new construction projects. A home is considered part of the measure if a deposit was paid for its purchase or if a contract to purchase was signed within or after the year of its construction. The construction of new homes contributes significantly to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the U.S. It involves spending on materials, labor, and various services, which can stimulate economic activity. New home sales data is a critical metric for assessing economic health, understanding employment trends, and gaining insights into the dynamics of the housing market. The Chart You can clearly see that we never really recovered after the 2005 peak of 1.39m units, however bottomed in 2011 and started making a slow climb from 273k to a 1.04m peak in August 2020. This remains the recent peak and has not been recovered. An almost 50% reduction in New Home Sales followed reducing from 1.04m to 543k units over 23 months ending July 2022. We are currently 10% above this level at 590k (for Nov) having rolled over in July 2023 from 728k. The chart looks very concerning. Should we lose the diagonal and horizontal support with this month or next months data release, it could be very telling of a struggling new housing market. We have tested the horizontal support three times and you would hope that this would hold. Time will tell. Comparing the Charts Here is where it gets a little interesting. When you look at both charts and compare them you can see that between June 2022 and Sept 2023 the decreasing EXISTING home sales negatively correlated with the increase in NEW home sales. This would make surface level sense given the lack of existing homes being available creating a need for new housing. In recent months there has been a sharp divergence in the opposite direction, particularly in NEW home sales, which plunged from 717k in Sept 2023 to 590k in Nov 2023. EXISTING Home Sales increased marginally from 3.79m in Oct 2023 to 3.82m in Nov 2023. Is this a turning point? Obviously a combination of factors are at work here and its not just existing supply coming to the market that might be disrupting new home sales or vice versa but its interesting seeing this correlation and its something to keep an eye on for investors and policy makers. Sale of brand new homes creates a lot of economic activity and if sales are declining significantly whilst existing homes are starting to come back onto the market, one would presume it would stress the housing market and the economy. We may need reduced interest rates sooner rather than later to help fan the flames of the new housing market, or maybe its time the market takes a breather? What do you think? It certainly adds to the argument for lower rates sooner from the Federal Reserve to "soften the landing" or that divergence noted today. On Macro Monday 21 we covered the NAHB Housing Market Index and its close correlation to U.S Housing Starts. If you enjoyed this read today, you should take a look at that. They are two useful additions that give another view. I'll throw the link in the comments. Thanks for coming along again 🤓 if you enjoyed this or found it informative please let me know PUKA
FRED:EXHOSLUSM495S
by PukaCharts
SOLOS-CHART2013(KAFKA)1. Lines representing the money supply metrics for the United States (US M2 - blue line) and the central banks for Japan (JP M2 - purple line) and the European Union (EU M2 - dotted purple line), charted against the left vertical axis as percentages. The money supply data shows a significant increase over time, especially notable during the time period that aligns with the COVID-19 pandemic where expansionary monetary policies were common. 2. A comparison of currency pair exchange rates, charted against the right vertical axis in terms of index values: EUR/JPY (red line), JPM2/EUM2 (green line), and USD/JPY (orange line). These pairs reflect the value of the euro and the U.S. dollar against the Japanese yen, and the ratio between the Japanese and European money supply measures.
ECONOMICS:USM2
by Kafka_BoardGame
Latest Solos-Chart(KAFKA)1. Lines representing the money supply metrics for the United States (US M2 - blue line) and the central banks for Japan (JP M2 - purple line) and the European Union (EU M2 - dotted purple line), charted against the left vertical axis as percentages. The money supply data shows a significant increase over time, especially notable during the time period that aligns with the COVID-19 pandemic where expansionary monetary policies were common. 2. A comparison of currency pair exchange rates, charted against the right vertical axis in terms of index values: EUR/JPY (red line), JPM2/EUM2 (green line), and USD/JPY (orange line). These pairs reflect the value of the euro and the U.S. dollar against the Japanese yen, and the ratio between the Japanese and European money supply measures.
ECONOMICS:USM2
by Kafka_BoardGame
1
Core and Headline Producer Price Index (PPI) Release Core and Headline PPI (Dec 2023 figures) U.S. Headline PPI Prev: 0.8% / Exp: 1.3% Rep: 1.0% ✅ Lower than expected ✅ U.S. Core PPI (excludes food and energy) Prev: 2.0% / Exp: 1.9% Rep: 1.8% ✅ Lower Than Expected✅ What is PPI and why is it important? Producer Price Index is a crucial economic indicator that provides valuable information about inflationary pressures at the producer level. By tracking changes in producer prices over time, it provides insights into inflation trends before they manifest in consumer prices. Difference between Core and Headline PPI The Core PPI aims to provide a more stable measure of underlying inflation, while the headline index reflects all price changes, including those driven by more volatile components such as food an energy. You can see from the chart that Headline PPI in red is the swings more widely up and down due to the inclusion of these volatile components (food and energy). ✅ LOWER THAN EXPECTED PPI TODAY✅ Core and Headline PPI came in lower than expected this month and as you can see we are reaching down into the historically more moderate zone between 3% and -1.5%. This bodes will for inflationary pressures in general and may be an early indicator of lower Core and Headline inflation figures (for CPI) in the coming months. PUKA
ECONOMICS:USCPPYY
by PukaCharts
Macro Monday 9~ Initial Jobless Claims MACRO MONDAY 9 Initial Jobless Claims Historical Analysis and Important upcoming levels Initial claims are new jobless claims filed by U.S. workers seeking unemployment compensation, included in the unemployment insurance weekly claims report. "Initial claims" refers to the government report on the number of workers applying for unemployment benefits for the first time following job loss First-time jobless claims can be a useful leading indicator because elevated numbers tend to lead to further economic weakness, and to decline ahead of a recovery Initial claims show the recent layoffs trend and does not a full picture of the labor market however it can provide more frequent data points indicating the trend in layoffs based on the recent decisions of U.S. employers. The layoffs trend can be particularly telling at economic turning points. With that in mind lets look at the chart and its historic patterns. The Chart The chart looks complicated but is incredibly simple and can be summarised as follows. - Recessions are in red - Increases to Initial Jobless Claims prior to recessions are in blue - It is clear that prior to recessions Jobless Claims typically increase but for how long and by what amount? - The min/max increase in claims prior to recession is between 35k - 127k - The min/max timeframe of increasing claims prior to recession is 7 - 23 months - The average of the above is a 71k claims increase over a 14 month period. - At present we are below that average at 49k increase over 11 months @ 230,000 claims. - I have set out levels on the chart for us to monitor going forward in line with the min and max claims amounts and timelines as above. We can monitor these levels on trading view going forward just by pressing play and seeing if we are nearing or hitting the indicative levels. - Once we reach the average increase amount at 252k or the average timeline of 14 months in Nov 2023, we are entering into higher risk recession territory. Currently, the max increase in claims prior to recession is projected to be at the level of 308,000 (based on historic claims) and the max timeframe is out to Aug 2024 (based on historic timeframes) thus indicating that between Nov 2023 and Aug 2024, subject to continued increasing initial claims (above the average level of 252,000) it is probable that there will be a recession within this time window (Not guaranteed). If initial claims fall below their recent low of 200,000 I believe this might invalidate the possibility of a recession or at least have a significant lagging effect on time horizon. At present this outcome seems unlikely but anything is possible and we can monitor this on an ongoing basis. The current yield curve inversion on the 2/10 year Treasury Spread provided advance warning of recession/capitulation prior to all of the above recessions however it provided us a wide 6 - 22 month window of time from the time the yield curve made its first definitive turn back up to the 0% level (See Macro Monday 2). September will be the 6th month of that 6 – 22 month window and thus we are closing in on dangerous territory very fast. From reviewing initial jobless claims we can see how from Nov 2023 we are stepping into a higher risk zone on this chart also (subject to continued higher increases in claims). Should we have claims higher than the average of 252,000 we will be confirming another step towards a higher risk of a recession. Factoring in yield curve inversion and the initial jobless claims we could consider the months of Sept-Oct 2023 as Risk level 1 (yield curve inversion time window opens) and Nov-Dec 2023 as stepping into a higher Risk Level 2 (Jobless claims average timeframe hit). Should the yield curve continue to move up towards being un-inverted and should Jobless Claims increase then Jan 2024 forward could be considered a higher Risk level 3. Adding to the above concerns is that M2 Money supply is still reducing (Macro Monday 8) and Global Net Liquidity is continuing to reduce (Macro Monday 4) as the S&P 500 is hitting a major resistance zone when accounting for M2 money supply (Macro Monday 8). At present it is clear that liquidity is reducing both globally and in the US. Currently fiscal stimulus appears to be filling the gaps and may be causing additional lagging effects to the changes we have seen imposed by Federal Reserve (balance sheet reduction and increased interest rates). Keep in mind that the Fed is also targeting higher unemployment to help quell the effects of inflation thus adding to the relevance of the Initial Jobless Claims numbers. Continued jobless claims are another metric that is not covered here today. Continued Jobless Claims accounts for the continuation of claims over a time period, thus indicating that those workers who made the first “Initial claims” have remained unemployed thereafter and have not managed to get new work. We might cover this in a future Macro Monday. Let me know if you want it sooner than later? We need all the help we can find in managing risk going forward and I hope all these charts can help you with that. We can monitor all these charts on my trading view just by pressing play and seeing where things are going. Regardless ill be providing updates along the way. Be safe out there PUKA
Editors' picks
ECONOMICS:USIJC
by PukaCharts
37
MACRO MONDAY 11~ Cont. Jobless Claims MACRO MONDAY 11 Continued Jobless Claims ECONOMICS:USCJC Continued Jobless Claims are the continued unemployment benefits claimed by workers who made their first “Initial claim” and remained unemployed in the weeks that followed. In other words, Initial Jobless Claims account for only the people that claimed their first week of unemployment benefit whilst Continued Jobless Claims accounts for people who continued to seek their unemployment benefit into week 2 and subsequent weeks. In order to be classified as a continuing claim, an unemployed individual must be unemployed for at least one week after filing an initial claim. They will be removed from the metric when they return to work. Whilst continuous claims do provide an aggregate of accumulating unemployment numbers over time, initial claims are reported sooner and considered more important to financial markets. Regardless there is a clear historic pattern on the Continued Claims Chart that demonstrates that continued jobless claims increase prior to recessions, and at present we are reaching higher than historical averages that have preceded recessions. The Chart The chart can be summarized as follows: - Recessions are in red - Increases in Continuous Jobless Claims prior to recessions are in blue - It is clear that prior to recessions Continuous Jobless Claims typically increase but for how long and by what amount? - The min/max increase in claims prior to recession is between 218k - 614k - The min/max timeframe of increasing claims prior to recession is 6 – 21 months - The average of the above is a 424k claim increase over a 11 month period. - At present we are now at the avg. 11 months time period and sit at an increase of 380k, however we exceeded 520k in continuous claims increases in Apr 2023. This obviously means since April 2023 continuous claims have reduced however the reduction is marginal against the larger move. - I have set out levels on the chart for us to monitor going forward in line with the min and max claims amounts and timelines as above. We can monitor these levels on trading view going forward just by pressing play and seeing if we are nearing or hitting the indicative levels. - If we reach the average increase amount at >424k AGAIN we are entering into higher risk of recession territory. We are already in month 11 of increases to continuous claims which is the average timeframe prior to a recession commencing. To be exact it is approx. 11.5 months therefore the 2ndhalf of the month of September is where we step into a higher risk level. Currently, the max increase in claims prior to recession is projected to be at a level of 1.928 million (based on historic claims) and the max timeframe is out to Jun 2024 (based on historic timeframes) thus indicating that between Aug 2023 and Jun 2024, subject to ongoing increasing continuous claims (holding above the average level of 1.734 million) it is probable that there will be a recession within this 11 month time window (Not guaranteed). If continuous claims fall below their minimum historic pre-recession level of 1.51 million I believe this might invalidate the possibility of a recession or at least have a significant lagging effect on time horizon. At present this outcome seems unlikely but anything is possible and we can monitor this on an ongoing basis. We now have a number of charts demonstrating that from Sept 2023 to Mar/Apr 2024 we have a significantly increased probability of recession. These charts were shared just a few days ago if want to have a look. These charts are as follows: 1. The current yield curve inversion on the 2/10 year Treasury Spread provided advance warning of recession/capitulation prior to all of the recessions outlined on the below chart however it provided us with a wide 6 - 22 month window of time from the time the yield curve made its first definitive turn back up to the 0% level. Sept 2023 is the 6th month of that 6 – 22 month window. The 22nd month is Jan 2025. The average time before a recession after the yield curve starts to turn up is 13 months or April 2024. - Based on this chart it is clear that there is substantially increased recession risk between Sept 2023 – April 2024. 2. Interest Rate Hike & S&P500 chart (Macro Monday 8). In the event that the Federal Reserve is pausing rates from Sept 2023, historic timelines of major hike cycles suggest a 7 month pause like in 2000 or a 16 month pause in line with 2007 (an avg. of both is c.11 months). For reference COVID-19’s rate pause was for 6 months. - 6 months from now would be March 2024 and 16 months from now would be Nov 2024. The average of both Jun 2024. - Based on this chart it is clear again that there is substantially increased recession risk between Sept 2023 – March 2024 of recession, increasing again thereafter from May onwards. 3. Initial Jobless Claims are currently increasing and are reaching pre-recessionary levels. If initial jobless claims surpasses its historic pre-recession averages of 252,000 of increased claims and if claims continue to increase past Nov 2023, this suggests we are entering into a much higher risk of recession. - Whilst this chart is not indicating the Sept 2023 to Mar/Apr 2024 time window as the two charts above are, it may present a date within that window of time from Nov 2023 forward (subject to continued increases). 4. Today’s chart Continuing Jobless Claims suggests that we have broken past both the increase in claims average of 424k (to 1.734 mln) and we are into month 11 which is the average timeframe of increases prior to recession commencement. - Todays chart is suggesting we are already in a recession or have just started into one. Another breach back above the 1.734 mln level (average level) would be a good confirmation signal that the risk of recession remains on the table. With this in mind it is important to recognize that on average official declaration of recession can be declared up to 8 months after a recession has started, so we should be on the look out for indications of a recession starting (without the official declaration). Today’s chart and the above charts suggest the following: 1. Significantly increased risk of recession from the 2nd half of September 2023: - 2/10 year Treasury Spread 6 – 22 month recession risk window opens from Sept 2023. - Average timeframe of increases in continuous jobless claims prior to recession is from the 2nd week in September. - The last time the Federal Reserve paused interest rates, the COVID-19 crash occurred 6 months later. 6 months from a Sept 2023 pause would be March 2024. 2. The Recession Risk increase higher from Nov 2023 - Average timeframe of increases in Initial Jobless Claims prior to recession is hit. Adding to the above concerns is that M2 Money supply is still reducing (Macro Monday 8) and Global Net Liquidity is continuing to reduce (Macro Monday 4) as the S&P 500 is hitting a major resistance zone when accounting for M2 money supply (Macro Monday 8). At present it is clear that liquidity is reducing both globally and in the US. Currently fiscal stimulus appears to be filling the gaps and may be causing additional lagging effects to the changes we have seen imposed by Federal Reserve (balance sheet reduction and increased interest rates). Keep in mind that the Fed is also targeting higher unemployment to help quell the effects of inflation thus adding to the relevance of the Initial Jobless Claims and continuous jobless claims numbers. We can monitor these charts on my trading view just by pressing play and seeing where things are going. Regardless ill be providing updates along the way of claims releases and other important data. Be safe out there as we enter into a high risk zone (no guarantees) PUKA
ECONOMICS:USCJC
by PukaCharts
2
Core and Headline CPI RELEASED (Dec 2023 figures)Core and Headline CPI (Dec 2023 figures) U.S. Headline CPI Prev: 3.1% Exp: 3.2% Rep: 3.4% 🚨 HIGHER THAN EXPECTED 🚨 U.S. Core CPI Prev: 4.0% Exp: 3.8% Rep: 3.9% 🚨 HIGHER THAN EXPECTED - but still fell from 4% to 3.9%✅ CORE CPI FALLS BELOW 4% FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE MAY 2021 We have a long way to go before we reach the Fed Target of 2%. Additional info previously shared: Core vs Headline (the difference) You can clearly see how Core CPI is less volatile than Headline CPI on the chart. Core CPI removes the volatile food and energy expenditures to provide the underlying inflation trend. Food and Energy is included in the Headline inflation which as you can see from the chart is much more volatile and changes direction quicker than core inflation. Its almost like an oscillator around the core inflation line. The Feds 2% Target It is clear that we are not at the Federal Reserve’s target inflation rate of 2% on both fronts (purple line). It is critical to understand that we are still not at or below the target 2% level regardless of the FOMC’s determination of a likely hold on interest rates and reductions to interest rates in 2024. Lets see can the target be met first. You can see that since 2002 Core CPI has fluctuated one standard deviation above and below the 2% inflation level between 1% and 3%. It is clear that we are not back into this standardised zone between 1 – 3%.
ECONOMICS:USIRYY
by PukaCharts