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Economy

Credit Conditions and the Fed: Part 2In part 2 I take a quick look at high yield corporates and describe a common mistake made in using ETF ratios to monitor changes in credit risk. Part one and an earlier piece that described how to use the TradingView platform to monitor secondary market credit spreads are linked below. If there is any one thing that will produce a Fed policy a pivot, it is credit distress. Credit is far more vital to economic functionality than equity. If companies are unable to secure funding, they may face liquidity issues, and if liquidity problems become widespread, they have the potential to become systemic. In 2008 and again in 2020 credit markets were frozen. Particularly in 2008, many companies ran into barriers that inhibited their conducting their ongoing daily business lines. There were plenty of offers but, as I so painfully remember, in many cases zero bids…. None…at any price. It was this credit distress that convinced the Fed to move. In part 1 we looked at the weekly chart of the option adjusted spread (OAS) of the broad ICE BofA Corporate Index and concluded that the there is no evidence of the kind of credit distress that would galvanize the Fed, and that, at least on this basis, that there was no compelling value (rich/cheap) argument to be made. What of high yield? Does high yield OAS suggest a meaningful deterioration in credit markets? Again, I plot a regression mean and one and two standard deviation bands above and below. Just as in the IG market, high yield OAS has widened, but only to its long term mean, and this following a lengthy period of being nearly a standard deviation rich. In short, while spreads have widened somewhat, there is no compelling rich/cheap argument and certainly nothing that would suggest to the Fed that credit conditions are meaningfully impaired. I frequently see commentaries that use price changes in the high yield ETF (HYG) and the investment grade ETF (LQD) as a measure of investor risk preference. Since the January high, LQD is down 26.15% versus 19.65% for high yield. At first glance it appears as if investors prefer the lower quality HYG. But the price changes do not account for the differences in fund duration. Put simply, LQD at 8.36 years duration has roughly twice the interest sensitivity of HYG at 4.06 years. In other words, a 100 bps change in rate, will change LQD 8.36% and HYG 4.06%. LQD in Ratio with HYG and Ten Year Futures in Ratio to Five Year Futures: I also see analysis that uses the ratio between LQD and HYG to ascertain risk preference. But the direction of the ratio is almost completely due to the difference in duration. You can see this by compare LQD/HYG to the ratio between ten year and five year note futures. LQD/HYG ratio is almost entirely correlated with changes between five and ten year treasuries. When rates are volatile and directional the total return of many rate products generally a reflection of rates than it is investor quality preference. And finally, many of the topics and techniques discussed in this post are part of the CMT Associations Chartered Market Technician’s curriculum. Good Trading: Stewart Taylor, CMT Chartered Market Technician Taylor Financial Communications Shared content and posted charts are intended to be used for informational and educational purposes only. The CMT Association does not offer, and this information shall not be understood or construed as, financial advice or investment recommendations. The information provided is not a substitute for advice from an investment professional. The CMT Association does not accept liability for any financial loss or damage our audience may incur.
Editors' picks
FRED:BAMLH0A0HYM2
by CMT_Association
9
Unemployment Rate vs SPXI'm just the messenger. SPX - orange Unemployment Rate - Blue Indicator - Moving Average out of Unemployment Rate This isn't a rule, as many sectors influence the market, but big crashes have been paired with a growing Unemployment rate. Here we can see that it bottomed and is consolidating - which proofs a strong economy and no need to crash - this suggests the ongoing decline was just a correction. To visualize this a bit more - I have coded a simple moving average to see when that curve will start heading up - and for now it isn't even turning up - this allows the market to push up before it starts turning. But when it will ... Hold on to your seats lads and ladies. It's gonna be a fast ride. Cheers!
FRED:UNRATE
by TheSecretsOfTrading
Corporate Credit Conditions Part 1Since credit has far greater potential to create systemic issues than does equity, corporate credit conditions are much more important to the Federal Reserve (Fed) than changes in equity prices. If you have interest in macro, monitoring and understanding the basics of corporate credit is a must have skill. If there is any one thing that might actually cause a Fed pivot, it is disfunction in this market. There is a significant amount of current commentary around the sharply higher all-in-yields of high yield (HY) and investment grade (IG) corporate debt. In most cases the pieces conflate extreme price weakness in the large credit ETFs (HYG & LQD) with credit distress. Most pieces seem to conclude that the declines are linked to declines in credit quality and highlight financing problems in the sector. Most of that commentary suffers from a misunderstanding of the relationship between credit and Treasury spreads, what the price declines/yield increases are communicating about macro conditions, and how vulnerable companies, particularly IG companies, are being forced to refinance into a higher rate environment. In February 2022 I published a piece on credit conditions that covered using the TradingView platform to monitor secondary market credit spreads and conditions, why the declines in most credit ETFs had nothing to do with credit quality, and the basics of monitoring credit on the platform. That piece is linked below. The short course: 1) Corporates trade at a yield spread to treasuries. The spread compensates the corporate debt investor for the higher risk of default. 2) If Treasury yields rise, their dollar price declines. Since corporates trade at a yield spread to treasuries, if treasury yields rise, so do corporate yields (prices decline). 3) Since corporate spreads are generally far less volatile than Treasury yields, in most time periods, corporate total returns are driven by changes in Treasury yields rather than changes in corporate spreads. 4) The lower the credit quality, the wider the spread or default compensation. For instance, BBB rated corporates have more credit risk and thus more spread/yield above Treasuries than A rated bonds, 6.27 verses 5.65%. The difference of 62 basis points is the markets compensation (risk premium) for owning the riskier bond. The chart is a weekly chart of the option adjusted spread (OAS) of the ICE BofA Corporate Index back to the 1997 index inception. OAS is the standard way of assessing the credit spread compensation over and above the Treasury rate. The higher the OAS, the more compensation the investor receives. The bands are plotted 1 and 2 standard deviations above and below the from inception date median value. The large spikes higher in 2008 and 2020 are the great financial crisis and the pandemic. Spread compensation is only now back to the long term median. This after spending most of the last decade trading nearly a standard deviation rich to the long term median. I view this as the residual of the Feds QE translating to richer than normal asset prices. In short, there is no evidence of credit distress in the broad IG market. There is also, at least in this chart, no compelling value argument to be made. However, credit spread is only part of the equation. Remember that corporate total returns are more a function of changes in base or treasury rates than in changes in corporate spreads. In the next installment we will focus on the IG and HY markets in detail, some fundamental observations and finally, the correlation between rates and the major credit ETFs. And finally, many of the topics and techniques discussed in this post are part of the CMT Associations Chartered Market Technician’s curriculum. Good Trading: Stewart Taylor, CMT Chartered Market Technician Taylor Financial Communications Shared content and posted charts are intended to be used for informational and educational purposes only. The CMT Association does not offer, and this information shall not be understood or construed as, financial advice or investment recommendations. The information provided is not a substitute for advice from an investment professional. The CMT Association does not accept liability for any financial loss or damage our audience may incur.
Editors' picks
FRED:BAMLC0A0CM
by CMT_Association
29
0% Inflation very soon?United States Inflation Rate, Year-over-Year, 1914-2022 chart ---------------------------------------------------------------- Why do I think inflation will go down to 0%? Inflation is currently at the main trendline (established in 1920). This is a very strong resistance, and as a general rule, do not short a support or long a resistance. In other words, you don't want to speculate on inflation increasing when inflation is at its critical point. FED cares about their charts, and they also want the charts to look great. That's why they will push inflation down. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Why the Inflation Rate Matter? The inflation rate demonstrates the health of a country's economy. It is a measurement tool used by a country's central bank, economists, and government officials to gauge whether action is needed to keep an economy healthy. That's when businesses are producing, consumers are spending, and supply and demand are as close to equilibrium as possible. A healthy rate of inflation is good for both consumers and businesses. During deflation, consumers hold on to their cash because the goods will be cheaper tomorrow. Businesses lose money, cutting costs by reducing pay or employment. That happened during the subprime housing crisis. In galloping inflation, consumers spend now before prices rise tomorrow. That artificially increases demand. Businesses raise prices because they can, as inflation spirals out of control. When inflation is steady, at around 2%, the economy is more or less as stable as it can get. Consumers are buying what businesses are selling. ---------------------------------------------------------------- How is inflation measured? There are several ways to measure inflation, but the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics uses the consumer price index. The CPI aggregates price data from 23,000 businesses and 80,000 consumer goods to determine how much prices have changed in a given period of time. If the CPI rises by 3% year over year, for example, then the inflation rate is 3%. The Fed, on the other hand, relies on the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE). This index gives more weight to items such as healthcare costs. ---------------------------------------------------------------- How do you hedge against inflation? Because inflation causes money to lose value over time, hedging against it is an important part of any sound investing strategy. Investors use a diversified portfolio with a variety of asset types to offset inflation and ensure that the overall growth of their portfolio outpaces it. ---------------------------------------------------------------- YEAR - INFLATION RATE YOY - FED FUNDS RATE - BUSINESS CYCLE (GDP GROWTH) - EVENTS AFFECTING INFLATION 1929 0.6% NA August peak Market crash 1930 -6.4% NA Contraction (-8.5%) Smoot-Hawley 1931 -9.3% NA Contraction (-6.4%) Dust Bowl 1932 -10.3% NA Contraction (-12.9%) Hoover tax hikes 1933 0.8% NA Contraction ended in March (-1.2%) FDR's New Deal 1934 1.5% NA Expansion (10.8%) U.S. debt rose 1935 3.0% NA Expansion (8.9%) Social Security 1936 1.4% NA Expansion (12.9%) FDR tax hikes 1937 2.9% NA Expansion peaked in May (5.1%) Depression resumes 1938 -2.8% NA Contraction ended in June (-3.3%) Depression ended 1939 0.0% NA Expansion (8.0% Dust Bowl ended 1940 0.7% NA Expansion (8.8%) Defense increased 1941 9.9% NA Expansion (17.7%) Pearl Harbor 1942 9.0% NA Expansion (18.9%) Defense spending 1943 3.0% NA Expansion (17.0%) Defense spending 1944 2.3% NA Expansion (8.0%) Bretton Woods 1945 2.2% NA Feb. peak, Oct. trough (-1.0%) Truman ended WWII 1946 18.1% NA Expansion (-11.6%) Budget cuts 1947 8.8% NA Expansion (-1.1%) Cold War spending 1948 3.0% NA Nov. peak (4.1%) 1949 -2.1% NA Oct trough (-0.6%) Fair Deal, NATO 1950 5.9% NA Expansion (8.7%) Korean War 1951 6.0% NA Expansion (8.0%) 1952 0.8% NA Expansion (4.1%) 1953 0.7% NA July peak (4.7%) Eisenhower ended Korean War 1954 -0.7% 1.25% May trough (-0.6%) Dow returned to 1929 high 1955 0.4% 2.50% Expansion (7.1%) 1956 3.0% 3.00% Expansion (2.1%) 1957 2.9% 3.00% Aug. peak (2.1%) Recession 1958 1.8% 2.50% April trough (-0.7%) Recession ended 1959 1.7% 4.00% Expansion (6.9%) Fed raised rates 1960 1.4% 2.00% April peak (2.6%) Recession 1961 0.7% 2.25% Feb. trough (2.6%) JFK's deficit spending ended recession 1962 1.3% 3.00% Expansion (6.1%) 1963 1.6% 3.5% Expansion (4.4%) 1964 1.0% 3.75% Expansion (5.8%) LBJ Medicare, Medicaid 1965 1.9% 4.25% Expansion (6.5%) 1966 3.5% 5.50% Expansion (6.6%) Vietnam War 1967 3.0% 4.50% Expansion (2.7%) 1968 4.7% 6.00% Expansion (4.9%) Moon landing 1969 6.2% 9.00% Dec. peak (3.1%) Nixon took office 1970 5.6% 5.00% Nov. trough (0.2%) Recession 1971 3.3% 5.00% Expansion (3.3%) Wage-price controls 1972 3.4% 5.75% Expansion (5.3%) Stagflation 1973 8.7% 9.00% Nov. peak (5.6%) End of gold standard 1974 12.3% 8.00% Contraction (-0.5%) Watergate 1975 6.9% 4.75% March trough (-0.2%) Stop-gap monetary policy confused businesses and kept prices high 1976 4.9% 4.75% Expansion (5.4%) 1977 6.7% 6.50% Expansion (4.6%) 1978 9.0% 10.00% Expansion (5.5%) 1979 13.3% 12.00% Expansion (3.2%) 1980 12.5% 18.00% Jan. peak (-0.3%) Recession 1981 8.9% 12.00% July trough (2.5%) Reagan tax cut 1982 3.8% 8.50% November (-1.8%) Recession ended 1983 3.8% 9.25% Expansion (4.6%) Military spending 1984 3.9% 8.25% Expansion (7.2%) 1985 3.8% 7.75% Expansion (4.2%) 1986 1.1% 6.00% Expansion (3.5%) Tax cut 1987 4.4% 6.75% Expansion (3.5%) Black Monday crash 1988 4.4% 9.75% Expansion (4.2%) Fed raised rates 1989 4.6% 8.25% Expansion (3.7%) S&L Crisis 1990 6.1% 7.00% July peak (1.9%) Recession 1991 3.1% 4.00% Mar trough (-0.1%) Fed lowered rates 1992 2.9% 3.00% Expansion (3.5%) NAFTA drafted 1993 2.7% 3.00% Expansion (2.8%) Balanced Budget Act 1994 2.7% 5.50% Expansion (4.0%) 1995 2.5% 5.50% Expansion (2.7%) 1996 3.3% 5.25% Expansion (3.8%) Welfare reform 1997 1.7% 5.50% Expansion (4.4%) Fed raised rates 1998 1.6% 4.75% Expansion (4.5%) LTCM crisis 1999 2.7% 5.50% Expansion (4.8%) Glass-Steagall repealed 2000 3.4% 6.50% Expansion (4.1%) Tech bubble burst 2001 1.6% 1.75% March peak, Nov. trough (1.0%) Bush tax cut, 9/11 attacks 2002 2.4% 1.25% Expansion (1.7%) War on Terror 2003 1.9% 1.00% Expansion (2.9%) JGTRRA 2004 3.3% 2.25% Expansion (3.8%) 2005 3.4% 4.25% Expansion (3.5%) Katrina, Bankruptcy Act 2006 2.5% 5.25% Expansion (2.9%) 2007 4.1% 4.25% Dec peak (1.9%) Bank crisis 2008 0.1% 0.25% Contraction (-0.1%) Financial crisis 2009 2.7% 0.25% June trough (-2.5%) ARRA 2010 1.5% 0.25% Expansion (2.6%) ACA, Dodd-Frank Act 2011 3.0% 0.25% Expansion (1.6%) Debt ceiling crisis 2012 1.7% 0.25% Expansion (2.2%) 2013 1.5% 0.25% Expansion (1.8%) Government shutdown. Sequestration 2014 0.8% 0.25% Expansion (2.5%) QE ends 2015 0.7% 0.50% Expansion (3.1%) Deflation in oil and gas prices 2016 2.1% 0.75% Expansion (1.7%) 2017 2.1% 1.50% Expansion (2.3%) 2018 1.9% 2.50% Expansion (3.0%) 2019 2.3% 1.75% Expansion (2.2%) 2020 1.4% 0.25% Contraction (-3.4%) COVID-19 2021 7.0% 0.25% Expansion (5.9%) COVID-19 2022 8.3% 3.25% Contraction (-1.6%) As of Sept. 21. 2022 2023 2.7% (est.) 2.8% (est.) Expansion (2.2%) March 2022 projection
ECONOMICS:USIRYYEducation
by UnknownUnicorn2537518
56